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This document has been pre-
pared for the Monetary Dialogue 
of 26 February 2018 between the 
European Parliament Committee 
on Economic and Monetary       
Affairs and the ECB.Low inflation despite economic recovery has given rise to the puzzle of “missing 
inflation”. Yet there would be no puzzle if the recovery is incomplete. While GDP is on 
the rise, some slack may still be present in some countries of the euro area. Against 
this backdrop, we investigate the empirical determinants of inflation and we investi-
gate their relative contributions to actual inflation since 2000 to explain why inflation 
is currently low.
Drawing on empirical estimations, we explain the dynamics of inflation since 2000 
by different cyclical and structural factors. We also introduce an indicator of both 
conventional and unconventional monetary policies to assess the direct incidence of 
ECB's policies on actual inflation. All these factors explain the bulk of inflation variance 
since 2000. The most important determinants of inflation in the euro area are inflation 
expectations and wage growth. Both indicators have contributed negatively to infla-
tion since 2014 but inflation expectations less so since 2015 whereas the contribution 
of wage growth has remained constant.
Drawing on evidence of uneven recovery across euro area Member States, it shall 
be recommended to keep on pursuing the expansionary stance of monetary policy 
until the ECB achieves its inflation objective. Moreover, the evolution of inflation and 
its determinants do not meet the conditions that the ECB regarded as genuine 
progress towards its policy objective. Inflation has not yet happened and is not 
expected in the medium-run; moreover, without second-round effects on wages, it is 
not yet possible to expect that once inflation goes back to target, it will be self-
sustained. 
The features of the ongoing developments in wage-price inflation suggest a 
decrease in the nominal anchor. The recent structural reforms may have put a drag on 
the ability of the ECB to reach its inflation target rapidly. The timing of structural 
reforms is important. They may be helpful at fostering innovation and productivity 
provided they are implemented after economic growth has been sustained and evenly 
distributed across the Member states, and after inflation has reached its medium-run 
objective.
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2017, hence showing signs of recovery, but consumer inflation remained subdued and 
unemployment rates declined only slowly. While real GDP has increased by 2.8% at 
the end of 2017, the EA headline inflation rate still evolves around 1.4% (see Figure 1). 
The question of why inflation does not increase together with the economic recovery 
becomes more and more topical. This question is even more acute for core inflation 
which measures the growth rate of prices when the most volatile components are 
excluded: it was still evolving below 1% at the end of 2017. It seemingly weakens one 
of the macroeconomic relationships which is at the foundations of (short-run) 
economic policies, the Phillips curve, which links inflation to output growth.
Questions about the reliability of the Phillips curve emerged during the crisis when 
despite economic slack, disinflation was “missing”. During the recovery, the puzzle 
seems to remain: though the unemployment rate has been declining, there are no 
signs of accelerating inflation, hence a situation of “missing inflation”.
Different factors have been invoked to explain the weakness in price dynamics. 
Some of them are related to cyclical economic factors whereas others are more struc-
tural (e.g. Mojon and Ragot, 2018). In this policy brief, we assess the role of the main 
determinants of inflation to provide some insights on the current weakness of inflation. 
Besides, we also take into account the possibility that the structure of the economy and 
the way inflation is determined has changed, and also the fact that the effect of the 
current monetary stimulus on inflation is less strong than expected.
In the remainder of this policy brief, we give an answer to the three following ques-
tions. First, how can we characterize the recent GDP growth: is it strong and evenly 
distributed across Member States, and what are the consequences on the unemploy-
ment rate? Second, what are the key determinants of inflation in the euro area: are they 
cyclical, structural or related to monetary factors? Third, have they changed and if yes, 
how and when?
We are then able to shed some light on the effectiveness of ECB monetary policy at 
pushing up inflation and supporting economic activity.
Buoyant growth but subdued inflation
Recent statistics on the economic situation in the euro area suggest that recovery is 
now sustained. In 2017Q4, GDP growth in the euro area has reached 2.7% compared 
with the fourth quarter of 2016, a performance not observed since the second quarter 
of 2011. At this time, the recovery was short-lived and euro area then experienced the 
second dip of the Great recession. Forecasts for 2018 suggest that the recovery would 
continue. According to the latest IMF forecasts, GDP growth would reach 2.2%. More-
over, the ongoing recovery is now generalized to all EMU countries. In 2017Q3, the 
year-on-year GDP growth has reached 2.8%, 2.3%, 1.7% and 3.1% in the four main 
euro area countries: Germany, France, Italy and Spain respectively. Even those coun-
tries in which growth was lagging behind have now escaped from the recession and 
record a positive growth: 1.3% for Greece and 2.5% in Portugal.
However, the economic slack remains significant in some countries as suggested by 
the OECD estimates for the output gap. Not all countries have fully recovered from the 
crisis. The output gap is still negative in Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Spain and especially in Greece where it is estimated at -11.1% (Figure 1). Besides, ten 
years after the outbreak of the crises, the euro area GDP is only 7% above its pre-crisis 
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The relationship between economic 
growth and the unemployment rate 
is called the Okun’s law.while it is still below for Greece (-25%), Cyprus, Portugal and Finland. The unemploy-
ment rate remains high (8.7%) and above its pre-crisis level for the euro area but is 
declining since its peak in 2013Q2. Besides, the recent developments in the labour 
market are not disconnected from economic activity.2 From 1999 onwards, the corre-
lation between GDP growth and change in the unemployment rate is slightly below -
0.4 suggesting that one point of growth triggers a reduction of the unemployment by 
0.4 point. Therein, the current decrease in the unemployment rate does not look at 
odds with historical evidence. It is even a bit better than one would expect from the 
long-run correlation (Figure 2).  
Figure 1. Output gaps in euro area countries (2017)
Source: OECD Economic outlook n°102.
Figure 2. GDP growth and unemployment rate
Source: Eurostat.
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More precisely, according to the 
Governing council, « Price stability is 
defined as a year-on-year increase in 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP) for the euro area of be-
low 2% ».The euro area recovery is therefore still under way and is accompanied by a reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate. At first sight, it comes yet as no surprise if inflation is 
still moderate.
Yet, one may wonder why inflation is not converging faster towards 2% – the ECB 
target3 – after the central bank has taken measures to increase inflation and boost 
economic activity. Since 2014, policy rates have been cut, and a negative interest rate 
policy for the interest rate on deposit facilities has been implemented. The ECB has also 
launched the asset purchase programme (APP) through which it notably purchases 
sovereign bonds on a large scale. Since the implementation of these policies, headline 
inflation has remained close to zero in 2014 and 2015, due notably to decreasing 
energy prices. Since the summer 2017, headline inflation has stood close or below 
1.5% (1.3% in January 2018 according to the Eurostat flash estimate). The dynamics of 
headline inflation may be partly driven by energy prices but looking at core inflation, 
which excludes the volatile components – notably energy and food – gives more or less 
the same range. Since the end of 2013, core inflation has stalled around 1% (Figure 3). 
Consequently, and at first glance, it seems that neither the improvement of economic 
situation nor the monetary policy measures have been effective at driving inflation up 
to the 2% target.
Those hypotheses will be assessed in the following section by estimating equations 
relating inflation to cyclical and structural factors. Before providing in-depths analyses, 
we first propose a description of the main features of inflation in the euro area.
First, although inflation and notably core inflation are low with regard to past histor-
ical experience, it is not the first episode of low inflation. Core inflation is generally 
decreasing when the unemployment rate increases. Moreover one episode during 
which core inflation has declined whereas economic activity was improving and the 
unemployment rate was decreasing occurred between January 1997 and May 2000 
(Figure 4). The current situation is then very close to the situation of the beginning of 
the year 2000. The unemployment was close to 9% and core inflation close to 1%. The 
current situation is not that exceptional except that the stance of monetary policy was 
not as much expansionary in 2000 as in the late 2010s.
Figure 3. Headline and core inflation in the euro area
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure A in the appendix shows the 
levels of headline and core inflation 
in 2017 for all euro area countries.Looking at the situation country by country, most of euro area countries are charac-
terized by low inflation. In 2017, Ireland recorded the lowest headline and core 
inflation rates: 0.3% and 0.2% respectively.4 In Germany, despite a low unemploy-
ment rate, headline inflation reached 1.7% in 2017 while core inflation was at 1.3%. A 
simple cross-country analysis shows that countries with higher level of output gap 
record higher core inflation. The slope of the relationship is nevertheless weak 
(Figure 5). Almost all euro area countries are therefore characterized by this low infla-
tion environment even if inflation is generally higher in countries where recovery has 
started earlier and has been stronger.
Figure 4. Core inflation and unemployment rate in the euro area
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 5. Output gap and core inflation in euro area countries (2017)
Source: Eurostat and OECD Economic Outlook n°102.
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6  | OFCE  policy briefFinally, one might wonder whether low inflation stems from weak inflation in 
services and/or in (non-energy) industrial goods. As illustrated in Figure 6, inflation is 
always lower for goods than for services. In both cases, the level of inflation at the end 
of 2017 is below the historical average. For industrial goods, it has remained below but 
close to its average. For services, there is a downward trend since 2013. While prices of 
services grew above 3% until 2008, their growth has significantly declined since then. 
Recent figures indicate that prices of services grow at a rate close to 1% so that it seems 
to be the main factor driving inflation in the recent period.
Several issues arise from this descriptive analysis:
1. To what extent do cyclical factors and persistent economic slack explain low
inflation?
2. Has the relationship between economic activity and inflation changed recently?
Inflation might be less responsive to activity, hence explaining why it has remained
subdued despite the on-going recovery.
3. Has expansionary monetary policy been ineffective at stimulating inflation?
4. Has low inflation been related to structural factors?
How do we explain the weakness of inflation in the euro 
area?
The recent evaluation of the Phillips curve by Blanchard (2016) has shown high 
residuals which signal an omitted-variable bias. Consequently, we choose to enlarge 
the scope for macroeconomic determinants of inflation beyond the usual determinants 
of the Phillips curve. To assess the different hypotheses presented above, we therefore 
propose to estimate a model of inflation determination that includes variables 
capturing three different types of factors: cyclical, structural and monetary factors. 
We estimate a simple linear model, using ordinary least squares (OLS), on euro area 
aggregate data from 2000 to 2017 at a monthly frequency. Data series are taken from 
the ECB database and Eurostat. These series are:
Figure 6. Industrial goods and services
Source: Eurostat.
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Mojon and Ragot (2018) attribute re-
cent weak inflation to an ongoing la-
bor supply shock due to the 
participation rate of workers be-
tween 55 and 64.■ cyclical factors
 ❏ inflation expectations 1-year ahead
 ❏ oil prices
 ❏ wage growth
 ❏ the Euro/Dollar exchange rate
 ❏ the output growth gap
■ structural factors
 ❏ potential growth
 ❏ the natural interest rate
 ❏ the trend in the employment rate 
 ❏ the overall stance of ECB monetary policies
The theoretical and empirical literature has shown that inflation expectations are 
supposed to have a positive effect on inflation. On the one hand, price setters would 
like to protect against increases in their costs. On the other hand, employees would 
seek to protect the purchasing power of their nominal wage and adjust them upward 
when they expect higher inflation. The importance attributed to the anchoring of 
expectations (e.g. Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Coibion, Gorodnichenko and 
Kamdar, 2017; Hubert and Le Moigne, 2016; Hasenzagl et al., 2018) contribute to 
resolving the so-called puzzles of “missing disinflation” and “missing inflation”. Oil 
prices are also expected to have a positive effect on inflation through the energy 
consumption bill for both households and firms. Wage growth and prices are also 
supposed to be positively linked as firms will want to protect their margins and will try 
to adjust their prices to the wage costs. An increase in the euro/dollar exchange should 
have a negative effect on prices as it reduces the price of imported goods. The variable 
measuring the slack of the economy in the inflation equation has taken many forms in 
the literature, from the mere difference between the unemployment rate and the 
natural rate of unemployment (Blanchard, 2016) to the labour’s share of income (Gali 
and Gertler, 1999). As a measure of slack, we use the output growth gap, which is the 
difference between actual GDP growth and potential growth. It indicates the degree of 
economic tensions and whether economy is under or over its natural rate of growth, so 
it is expected to be positively related to prices. 
On the side of structural factors, potential growth measured as the long-term trend 
in growth is supposed to reduce inflation because a higher value for the natural rate of 
growth means that the equilibrium point of labour or goods and services markets is 
higher. The same reasoning applies to the long-term trend in the employment rate, 
which is the ratio of the employed workers to the working age population and meas-
ures the degree of participation of the population to the labour force.5 Finally, the 
natural interest rate (here measured as the long-term trend in 10-year government 
bond yields), indicates the level of interest rate that supports the economy at full 
employment/maximum output while keeping inflation constant. So a higher natural 
interest rate should decrease inflation.
In a simple model like this, it is difficult to interpret the parameter between the 
monetary policy instrument and inflation. This coefficient measures both the reaction of 
policymakers to inflation (which should be positive) and the effect of monetary policy 
on inflation (which should be negative). However, we do include this variable in the 
model to capture the correlation (and double causality) between these two variables. 
The monetary policy stance is measured by the shadow rate estimated by Krippner 
(2013, 2014), which encompasses various monetary dimensions and represents the 
level of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy tools into a single vari-
able expressed in interest rate space. This is equivalent to an implicit interest rate set by 
8  | OFCE  policy brief
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A recent analysis from the Banque de 
France suggests that the slope of the 
Phillips curve – the effect of the out-
put gap on the inflation rate – is weak 
but has not significantly declined 
over the recent period (see Banque 
de France, 2018). the ECB and taking into account the unconventional monetary measures and the effect 
of central bank communication (the forward guidance policy for instance).
To account for a potential change in the parameters of the relationship between 
inflation and its determinants, we estimate the model over the full sample – from 
January 2000 to December 2017 – and over a shorter period starting in July 2012 after 
the “Whatever it takes” claimed by Mario Draghi. It signalled that the ECB stood ready 
to purchase assets issued by fragile countries if needed.
The first column of table shows the coefficients of the model estimated from 2000 
to 2017. The model explains a large part (83%) of the inflation variance over the 
period, which suggests that the model and the variable included are relevant for this 
analysis. In addition, all variables are significant and have the expected signs. Inflation 
expectations, oil prices, wage growth, the output gap, and the shadow rate have posi-
tive effects on inflation, while the euro/dollar exchange rate, the potential growth rate 
of the economy, the natural rate of interest and the trend in the employment rate have 
negative effects. 
The second column of table shows the coefficients estimated on the most recent 
sample period. Results should be interpreted with caution because they rely on a small 
number of observations (63). The model explains 90% of the variance of inflation over 
this period. Though standard errors may differ (in part because of the smaller number 
of degrees of freedom), point estimates are qualitatively similar in most cases. This is 
especially true for cyclical factors.6 However, coefficients associated to structural 
factors, which effects were negative over the full sample, are muted over the most 
recent period or even positive in the case of the trend in the employment rate.
Table. Estimates of the model for CPI determination
(1) (2)
2000-2017 2012-2017
CPI CPI
exp1y 1.948*** 2.121***
[0.18] [0.34]
oil 0.011*** 0,003
[0.00] [0.00]
wages 0.908*** 1.503***
[0.16] [0.47]
eurodol -1.318*** -1,522
[0.34] [0.94]
gap 0.185*** 0,085
[0.03] [0.17]
krippner 0.385*** 0.511***
[0.13] [0.12]
potential -0.252*** 0,008
[0.05] [0.20]
rstar -0.220*** 0,027
[0.05] [0.23]
trend_emprate -0.087** 0.176*
[0.04] [0.10]
constant 4.912** -13.993*
[2.26] [7.05]
N 210 63
R² 0,83 0,90
Standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
OFCE  policy brief |  9Based on these parameter estimates, we compute the average contribution of each 
variable to CPI and the marginal contribution at each date during the sample in ques-
tion. Figure 7 shows that, among the cyclical factors, inflation expectations and wage 
growth are the ones explaining most of the subdued dynamics of inflation over the 
most recent period. For instance, in 2015, inflation expectations pushed down inflation 
by almost 1.5%. Low inflation in the euro area would then mainly be explained by the 
weakness of wage growth and low inflation expectations. It might reflect the lack of a 
nominal anchor. It must be stressed though that the negative contribution of inflation 
expectations to actual inflation has declined since 2015 whereas the contribution of 
wage growth has increased in absolute value. This could highlight a lower pass-
through from inflation expectations to wages. 
Figure 7. Contribution of cyclical factors to CPI
Source: authors’ computations.
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contribution of potential growth and employment rate are negative and small, the 
contribution of the natural rate of interest is positive. The latter therefore tends to push 
inflation up.
Finally, Figure 9 shows the contribution of ECB policies measured with the shadow 
rate. First, the order of magnitude of the contribution to inflation is small compared to 
inflation expectations or wage growth. Second, the contribution is positive but 
decreasing over the last year or so. The effect of monetary policies could also be seen 
through the effect of inflation expectations on inflation, but here again (as shown in 
Figure 6), the effect on inflation has been negative. Overall, the effectiveness of mone-
tary policies in pushing inflation back to its target may be questioned. 
Figure 8. Contribution of structural factors to CPI
Source: authors’ computations.
Figure 9. Contribution of ECB policies to CPI
Source: authors’ computations.
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The euro area has entered a period of sustained recovery since 2015 which results in 
higher GDP growth and declining unemployment rates. Meanwhile, monetary policy 
has been very expansionary since the ECB engaged in a quantitative easing. Although 
accelerating growth coincides with the measures taken by the central bank, inflation 
remains muted. 
Empirical analysis suggests that though inflation is weak, it is not fully at odds with 
historical evidence on the relationship between economic activity and prices. Economic 
slack remains significant in some euro area countries and curbs the euro area inflation.
Drawing on evidence of uneven recovery across euro area Member States, it shall be 
recommended to keep on pursuing the expansionary stance of monetary policy until 
the ECB achieves its inflation objective. Though there is weak evidence of direct impact 
of monetary policy on inflation, indirect impact may be important via two channels: 
the anchoring of expectations and second-round effects.
Our analysis suggests that the weakness of inflation mainly stems from low expected 
inflation, notably from 2014 to 2016. It also suggests that wage growth has been too 
moderate to stimulate higher price inflation, hence monetary policy has not had 
second-round effects on wages. The evolution of inflation and its determinants do not 
meet the conditions that the ECB regarded as genuine progress towards its policy 
objective. Inflation has not yet happened and is not expected in the medium-run.
The features of the ongoing developments in wage-price inflation suggest a 
decrease in the nominal anchor. While it may seem that monetary policy has not had 
the expected effectiveness on the anchoring of inflation expectations, it may well be 
that its effects were offset by other policies. The recent push in favour of labour market 
deregulation and competitiveness policies may have contributed to lower wage 
growth and to the decline in the nominal anchor. Such a movement may put a drag on 
the ability of the ECB to reach its inflation target rapidly. An appropriate timing for 
reforms may be helpful at generating long-run growth (IMF, 2016, chapter 3) while 
delivering the inflation target: structural reforms in the euro area may be helpful at 
fostering innovation and productivity provided they are implemented after economic 
growth has been sustained and evenly distributed across the Member states, and after 
inflation has reached its medium-run objective.
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ANNEX
Figure A. Inflation in euro area countries
Source: Eurostat.
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